Based on alternative reduced games, several dynamic approaches are proposed to show how the three extended Shapley values can be reached dynamically from arbitrary efficient payoff vectors on multichoice games.
Introduction
A multichoice transferable-utility (TU) game, introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan 1 , is a generalization of a standard coalition TU game. In a standard coalition TU game, each player is either fully involved or not involved at all in participation with some other agents, while in a multichoice TU game, each player is allowed to participate with many finite different activity levels. Solutions on multichoice TU games could be applied in many fields such as economics, political sciences, management, and so forth. Van den Nouweland et al. 2 referred to several applications of multichoice TU games, such as a large building project with a deadline and a penalty for every day if this deadline is overtime. The date of completion depends on the effort of how all of the people focused on the project: the harder they exert themselves, the sooner the project will be completed. This situation gives rise to a multichoice TU game. The worth of a coalition resulted from the players working in certain levels to a project is defined as the penalty for their delay of the project completion with the same efforts. Another application appears in a large company with many divisions, where the profitmaking depends on their performance. This situation also gives rise to a multichoice TU game. The players are the divisions, and the worth of a coalition resulted from the divisions functioning in certain levels is the corresponding profit produced by the company.
Here we apply three solutions for multichoice TU games due to Hsiao and Raghavan 1 , Derks and Peters 3 , and Peters and Zank 4 , respectively. Two main results are as follows.
Advances in Operations Research
1 A solution concept can be given axiomatic justification. Oppositely, dynamic processes can be described that lead the players to that solution, starting from an arbitrary efficient payoff vector the foundation of a dynamic theory was laid by Stearns 5 . Related dynamic results may be found in, for example, Billera 6 
Preliminaries
Let U be the universe of players and N ⊆ U be a set of players. Suppose each player i has m i ∈ N levels at which he can actively participate. Let m m i i∈N be the vector that describes the number of activity levels for each player, at which he can actively participate. Given [1] ).
The H&R Shapley value Λ is the solution on MC which associates with each N, m, v ∈ MC and each player i ∈ N and each k i ∈ M i the value Hsiao and Raghavan 1 provided an alternative formula of the H&R Shapley value. Hwang and Liao 9 defined the H&R Shapley value in terms of the dividends
Note that the so-called dividend a α v is divided equally among the necessary players.
(ii) (Derks and Peters, [3] ).
The D&P Shapley value Θ is the solution on MC which associates with each N, m, v ∈ MC and each player i ∈ N and each k i ∈ M i the value
Note that the so-called dividend a α v is divided equally among the necessary levels.
(iii) (Peters and Zank, [4]).
The P&Z Shapley value Γ is the solution on MC which associates with each N, m, v ∈ MC and each player i ∈ N and each k i ∈ M i the value Peters and Zank 4 defined the P&Z Shapley value by fixing its values on minimal effort games and imposing linearity. Hwang and Liao 8 defined the P&Z Shapley value based on the dividends
Clearly, the P&Z Shapley value is a subdivision of the H&R Shapley value. For all N, m, v ∈ MC and for all i,
Axioms and Dynamic Approaches
In this section, we propose dynamic processes to illustrate that the three extended Shapley values can be reached by players who start from an arbitrary efficient solution.
In order to provide several dynamic approaches, some more definitions will be needed. Let ψ be a solution on MC. ψ satisfies the following.
The following axioms are analogues of the balanced contributions property due to Myerson 14 . The solution ψ satisfies the following.
The following axiom was introduced by Hwang and Liao 9 . The solution ψ satisfies the following.
In the framework of multichoice games, IIE asserts that whenever a player gets available higher activity level, the payoff for all original levels should not be changed under condition that other players are fixed.
The following axiom was introduced by Klijn et al. 11 . The solution ψ satisfies the following.
Klijn et al. 11 provided an interpretation of the equal loss property as follows. EL is also inspired by the balanced contributions property of Myerson 14 . In the framework of multichoice games, EL says that whenever a player gets available higher activity level the payoff for all original levels changes with an amount equal to the payoff for the highest level in the new situation. Note that EL is a vacuous property for standard coalition TU games.
Some considerable weakenings of the previous axioms are as follows. ii The solution Θ is the only solution satisfying 2WEFF 2EFF , WEL EL , 2UBC 2SBC , and 2CON.
iii The solution Γ is the only solution satisfying 2WEFF 2EFF , WIIE IIE , 2UBC 3SBC , and 2CON.
Next, we will find dynamic processes that lead the players to solutions, starting from arbitrary efficient payoff vectors. 
In order to exhibit such processes, let us define two alternative reduced games as follows. Let N, m, v ∈ MC, S ⊆ N, and let ψ be a solution and x a payoff vector. 
where t is a fixed positive number, which reflects the assumption that player i does not ask for adequate correction when t 1 but only usually a fraction of it. It is easy to check
m, v , and
h i,k i x i,k i ∈L N,m ∈ X 2 N, m, v if x ∈ X 2 N, m, v .
Inspired by Maschler and Owen 7 , we define correction functions f i,k i , g i,k i , h i,k i
on multichoice games. In the following, we provided some discussions which are analogues to the discussion of Maschler and Owen 7 . Let N, m, v ∈ MC and x be a 1-efficient payoff vector. By a process of induction we assume that the players have already agreed on the solution Λ for all p-person games, 1 < p < |N|. In particular, we assume that they agreed on Λ for 1-person games involving only Pareto optimality and for 2-person games which are side-payment games after an appropriate change in the utility scale of one player . Now somebody suggests that x should be the solution for an n-person game N, m, v , thus suggesting a solution concept Ψ, which should satisfy
3.11
On the basis of this Ψ, the members of a coalition S {i, j} will examine v x,Λ 1,S for related 1-consistency. If the solution turns out to be inconsistent, they will modify x "in the direction" which is dictated by Λ i,k i S, m S , v x,Λ 1,S in a manner which will be explained subsequently see the definition of f i,k i . These modifications, done simultaneously by all 2-person coalitions, will lead to a new payoff vector x * and the process will repeat. The hope is that it will converge and, moreover, converge to Λ N, m, v . Similar discussions could be used to g i,k i and h i,k i . 
3.15
Hence, for all q ∈ N,
3.16
If 0 < t < 4/|N|, then −1 < 1 − |N| · t /2 < 1 and {x In fact, the proofs of 1 , 2 , and 3 are similar to Theorem 3.2. Proof. "EL" instead of "IIE", the proofs of this theorem are immediate analogues Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.3, hence we omit them.
Player-Action Reduction and Related Consistency
By reducing the number of the players, Hwang and Liao 8-10 proposed 1-reduction and 2-reduction on multichoice games. Here we define two types of player-action reduced games by reducing both the number of the players and the activity levels. Let N, m, v ∈ MC, S ⊆ N \ {∅}, ψ be a solution and γ ∈ M N\S .
i 
The player-action reduced games are based on the idea that, when renegotiating the payoff distribution within S, the condition γ ∈ M N\S means that the members of N \ S continue to cooperate with the members of S. All members in N \ S take nonzero levels based on the participation vector γ to cooperate. Then in the player-action reduced games, the coalition S with activity level α cooperates with all the members of N \ S with activity level γ. 
